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LEGITIMACY OF JUDICIAL RULEMAKING

THE LEGITIMACY OF JUDICIAL RULEMAKING:
A REPLY TO PROFESSOR HERBERT

William H. Page
Professor Herbert's spirited response to my article both advances and impedes the debate on the rulemaking power. He is
to be commended, first of all, for disavowing any reliance on an
historical rulemaking power. I had assumed, from certain ambiguous indications, that the Mississippi Supreme Court accepted
uncritically Roscoe Pound's thesis that early English and American
courts had such an inherent power, and I therefore took the time
to refute it. I think my assumption was reasonable, if cautious,
but Professor Herbert may be right that the court simply ignored
history. Even if this is true, however, I do not think I have wasted
my breath. Most commentators would agree that the historical
understanding of a constitutional power is at least relevant in interpreting its scope.
Professor Herbert has led the debate astray, however, in two
important ways. First he suggests the relevance of "recent history,"
as opposed to earlier history, in the analysis; the historical dereliction of the state legislature in procedural reform, he argues,
somehow justifies the action of the supreme court. This, however,
is simply a rhetorical way of saying the end justifies the means.
As I make clear in the article, the need for procedural reform,
which I readily concede, does not create a power in the court to
bring it about, nor does it divest the legislature of its constitutional powers.
Professor Herbert's argument is far more seriously defective,
however, on a second point. He mistakenly pictures me as urging that the state supreme court should simple-mindedly follow
the example of the United States Supreme Court on the question
of judicial rulemaking. In fact, my argument has little to do with
Supreme Court precedent; it is grounded on basic principles of
constitutional interpretation.
It is important to draw a distinction here that seems to elude
Professor Herbert. There are at least two sorts of constraints on
the action of state supreme courts: the dictates of the United States
Supreme Court, and the principles of legal interpretation. The

1. Herbert, Process, Procedure and Constitutionalism: A Response to Professor Page, 3
Miss. C. L. REv. 45 (1982).
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first of these, in spite of the implication of Professor Herbert's
citation of Sunburst Oil,' among other cases, has nothing to do
with my argument. The United States Supreme Court is supreme
only on questions of federal law; state court interpretations of state
constitutions are thus obviously not subject to reversal by the
United States Supreme Court unless they independently violate
some provision of federal law, such as the Due Process Clause
of the fourteenth amendment. Sunburst, for example, simply held
that a state court's practice of applying some of its decisions only
prospectively did not violate the federal constitution. 3 I do not
argue that the Mississippi court's action in any way violates federal
law. Still less relevant are United States Supreme Court cases
holding that state economic legislation does not violate the fourteenth amendment. Such cases are filled with statements that the
states are free to experiment in the area of economic regulations,
but this language refers only to freedom from compulsion by the
federal constitution. Again, I do not argue that any such compulsion applies to the state supreme court in the area of judicial
rulemaking.
In spite of the absence of compulsion by the United States
Supreme Court, however, a state supreme court is not free to give
whatever meaning it chooses to the state constitution. On the contrary, there are principles of construction that bind every court,
albeit in a less tangible way. Since Professor Herbert's response
seems at times to question even this basic starting point, perhaps
I should elaborate. Government in a democracy derives its authority from the consent of the people, as expressed in a written constitution. The very idea of a written constitution implies a reliance
on the rule of law as opposed to the fiat of an individual. To say
the court need not concern itself with the text, history, and structure of the constitution is to say that there is no written constitution, only the shifting whims of the individual justices. Of course,
there is no superior authority that will compel a court to adhere
to its state constitution; even a constitutional amendment that purports expressly to overturn the court's action could, as a practical
matter, be simply disregarded by a willful court. But the mere
fact that the court has given a construction to the state constitution does not make that construction correct. It is our role as
lawyers to test the coherence of the court's actions and their consistency with law and principle.
2. Id. at 49.
3. Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Sunburst Oil and Refinery Co., 287 U.S. 358 (1932).
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Once this point is conceded, then the debate should begin on
the legitimate issue: do the text, history, and structure of the state's
constitution warrant the court's assumption of a procedural
rulemaking power? The United States Supreme Court's interpretation of Article III of the federal Constitution is of some interest
on this question, but I do not argue that the state court should
uncritically defer to it. Instead, I argue that separation-of-powers
principles implicit in the state constitution independently compel
the conclusion that the state supreme court has no rulemaking
power. But, by his rhetorical device of casting me in the role of
advocating mindless deference, Professor Herbert liberates himself
from answering the arguments I do make or offering an independent constitutional argument in favor of the Court's action.
Professor Herbert's analysis of my "institutional competence"
argument is illustrative. I state the traditional position that courts
in a democracy can legitimately make law only by the gradual
accretion'of precedents in case-by-case decisionmaking, and even
then only subject to the final authority of the legislature. I develop
an argument for this position at some length in the article, pointing out, for example, that only in the context of the adversary
process is there any assurance that the court has been presented
with a complete factual record and legal arguments on an issue
before it, or that the court will offer a reasoned justification for
its action. All of the reasoning and authority I offer for my position apply with equal force to state and federal courts. Professor
Herbert, however, at no point responds to this argument on its
merits, apparently satisfied to disparage it as "spurious" and to
mischaracterize it as maintaining that the state must mimic the
federal model.' The requirement that judicial lawmaking occur
in a concrete case, he states, is simply a housekeeping requirement adopted for no reason, or for purely idiosyncratic reasons,
by the federal court system. Since the state constitution is not identical to the federal, the requirement has no application in Mississippi. By this magisterial gesture he dismisses the most basic traditional notions of the judicial process, without feeling compelled
to offer any new notion of legitimacy for judicial lawmaking.
At the conclusion of this section of his response, Professor
Herbert says that the "salient question" which I "[do] not address"
is "How is the . . . court's position that its new Rules of Civil
Procedure flow out of the Mississippi Constitution's separationof-powers provision instrumentally different from, for example,
4. Herbert, supra note 1, at 49.
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the United States Supreme Court's position that its 'Miranda' warnings flow out of the federal Constitution's self-incrimination
provision?" 5 As a matter of fact, I address precisely that issue at
precisely that point of my article to which Professor Herbert is
responding. The Miranda warning is a rule necessary to implement a specific constitutional guarantee, the fifth amendment's
privilege against self-incrimination. The Mississippi court's action in adopting the Rules (as opposed to its action in Newell")
is radically different: it is an assertion of final authority to adopt
rules across the entire range of civil and criminal procedure and
to displace procedural statutes without any finding that those
statutes are unfair or defective in any way other than that they
were adopted by the legislature. Miranda' displaces legislative
authority over procedure only where a specific provision of the
Bill of Rights requires it; the Rules displace legislative authority
over procedure whenever the Mississippi Supreme Court
disagrees. Apart from the scope of the authority, the process by
which the Rules were adopted is radically different. The Miranda rule was adopted in a concrete case; the Rules were adopted
as simple judicial legislation.
Professor Herbert's response to my judicial independence
argument, although unpersuasive, is at least addressed to issues
I raise. First, he asks, why does the judicial independence rationale
not justify the assertion of a rulemaking power, even though other
protections and powers adequately assure impartial decisionmaking
free from legislative and executive intrusion? If some judicial independence is good, why is not more better? The answer is that
judicial independence limits the powers of the executive and
legislative branches to intrude on the decision of individual cases;
it is not a source of power for the courts to intrude on the legitimate
functions of the legislature or executive. It extends only to what
is necessary to protect the integrity of the judicial function, not
to hampering the legislature in its lawmaking function.
In spite of Professor Herbert's optimism concerning the ability
of the court accurately to draw the line between substance and
procedure, the court may, by the exercise of its asserted authority, prevent the legislature from carrying out the will of the electorate. Professor Herbert's quotation from Moore8 does not answer
this concern because it is expressly addressed to the wisdom of
5.
6.
7.
8.

Id. at 50.
Newell v. State, 308 So. 2d 71 (Miss. 1975).
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
Herbert, supra note 1, at 52.
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Congress and thus assumes final legislative control over procedure.
At the end of his response Professor Herbert makes several
stray remarks which, he claims, are "worth noting" or "of some
significance."9 I disagree. The fact that Mississippi has an elective judiciary at all is of no significance, since judges are not
elected to represent the wishes of the majority on specific issues
but because of their ability to decide cases well; their authority
is not based on the principle of representation. Even if an elective judiciary had any significance, the critical fact is that at the
time the 1890 constitution was adopted the state's judiciary was
appointed.
Professor Herbert also states"° that Article IV of the Mississippi Constitution makes no reference to promulgation of rules of
civil procedure. As I point out in my article," however, the constitution makes reference at several points to civil procedure, and
in each case the responsibility for adoption of procedural rules
is given to the legislature.
Professor Herbert's argument, adopted from a student's note
on the subject, that the grant of express appellate jurisdiction to
a state supreme court somehow gives that court the rulemaking
power, is bewildering. Appellate jurisdiction means the power
to hear appeals of cases. How such a power implies a power to
adopt rules of procedure for the lower courts is unclear. Professor
Herbert also argues that the state's constitutional requirement that
the legislature establish chancery and circuit courts implicitly gives
the power to prescribe rules for those courts to the supreme court.
I have already answered this point in a footnote to my article,2
and I will not repeat that argument here.
Finally, I do not concede that the "high courts of eleven states
have claimed essentially the same authority" as the court."3 There
are important distinctions in both the authority for and the extent
of the Mississippi court's assertion of power. While it is certainly true that Mississippi need not follow the lead of other states,
one may reasonably ask that bold departures from traditional notions of legitimacy in lawmaking and judicial process be justified
by a coherent argument. This the court and Professor Herbert have
failed to provide.
9. Id. at 53,54.
10. Id. at 54.
11. Page, Constitutionalismand JudicialRulemaking: Lessonsfrom the Crisis in Mississippi, 3 Miss. C. L. REv. 1, 38, n. 228.
12. Id. at 37, n. 218.
13. Herbert, supra note 1, at 55-56.

